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ABSTRACT 
The so-called Special Relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom 
has been a signal feature of the foreign relations of the United States and the United 
Kingdom, especially in the past ten years of the war against terror. As such, the topic 
represents an important theme of policy for U.S. officers who serve in the United 
Kingdom or elsewhere. The present thesis seeks to understand how leading institutions 
and responsible figures in Britain view the Special Relationship within the contemporary 
strategic and political context. Furthermore, the thesis analyzes the nature, character, and 
durability of this strategic idea in UK statecraft from a British perspective in three case 
studies: a) the Iraqi campaign of 2001–2010; b) the Afghan campaign, 2001–present, and 
c) the most recent Libyan episode of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 
operations in 2011. In particular, this inquiry comprehends the Special Relationship as a 
feature of British diplomatic and strategic culture, and as an expression of shared values 
and institutions the character of which is vital for those charged with service in an Anglo-
American context as well as NATO. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The so called Special Relationship between the United States and the United 
Kingdom has been a signal feature of the foreign relations of the United States, especially 
in the past ten years of the war against terror, to say nothing of the world wars in the 
twentieth century at which time the rivalry between the two nations was replaced by 
alliance. In mid-2011, President Barack Obama, on a state visit to the United Kingdom, 
described this connection as the “essential relationship,” a cornerstone of security and 
peace in the world for decades. Queen Elizabeth II responded with her own toast to the 
“tried, tested, and—yes—Special Relationship” between the two countries, laying 
particular emphasis on the U.S.-British alliance of the era of the world wars as well as the 
Cold war. 
How do leading institutions and responsible figures in Britain view the Special 
Relationship within the contemporary strategic and political context in which war 
weariness and new challenges after a decade of conflict have made themselves felt amid 
the world economic crisis? The present thesis seeks to understand the nature, character, 
and durability of this strategic idea in UK statecraft from a British perspective in three 
case studies: a.) the Iraqi campaign of 2001–2010;  b.) the Afghan campaign, 2001–
present, and c.) the most recent Libyan episode of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization’s (NATO) operations in 2011. In particular, this inquiry seeks to understand 
the Special Relationship as a feature of British diplomatic and strategic culture, and as an 
expression of shared values and institutions the character of which is vital for those 
charged with service in an Anglo-American context as well as NATO. This work also 
examines the critics and opponents of the Special Relationship in British politics amid the 
particular strains that have manifested themselves in the past decade and more of conflict 




an historical analysis of political and strategic culture through values, institutions, and 
personalities and a contemporary-history perspective on events of yesterday and today in 
trans-Atlantic relations of the English speaking peoples. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
On 5 March 1946, Winston Churchill made his Sinews of Peace address at 
Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, more or less unveiling the Atlantic response to 
what presently became the Cold War and the evolution of U.S.-UK relations in the 
second half of the twentieth century. In his speech, Churchill made the first references to 
the Special Relationship. He said: “Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous 
rise of world organization will be gained without what I have called the fraternal 
association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between 
the British Commonwealth and Empire and the U.S.”1  Since the Second World War, 
relations between the United States and the United Kingdom have set the example for 
bilateral cooperation and collaboration in the international system of states based on 
shared values, interests, the need to organize the European system of states and, more 
recently in face of conflict beyond Europe and North America, in the former British 
Empire in such places as Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in Libya, itself a scene of 
British martial glory in World War II.  
The Special Relationship is founded on the cultural and historical connections 
between the two countries, as Churchill alluded, but also the shared traditions, values, 
interests, and institutions of a domestic and international nature. The traditions of liberal 
democracy, rule of law, and common history, alongside the continued cooperation since 
at least 1941 in defense, security, military, intelligence, and nuclear issues, stand at the 
very center of what makes this relationship unlike that of such U.S. allies as France, 
Germany, Japan or Iraq or others. In no small part, the Special Relationship derives from 
a deliberate British decision more or less since 1941 that deviates from the course of the 
French and the Germans in the geostrategic system as expressed in their respective 
                                                
1 Winston S. Churchill, “The Sinews of Peace Address,” NATO, 5 March 1946, accessed 17 
September 2011, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1946/s460305a_e.htm. 
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multilateral relations with the United States and the wider world. In this regard, the 
Special Relationship is, indeed, special, in the sense of being unique as well as uniquely 
enduring despite differences of policy and the wear and tear worked by the passage of 
decades in which other bilateral relationships have frayed and broken. 
The ability of this relationship to endure through times of war, peace, and change 
requires analysis, granted the stresses and strains that have also undermined this 
relationship not only in the distant past, but the immediate past and present. Additionally, 
the role of the relationship within such multilateral organizations as the United Nations 
(UN) and specifically the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is both positive 
and meaningful to understand the link between domestic politics, values, and 
international institutions in collective security and collective defense in perpetual crisis. 
Therefore, the details of how and why the Special Relationship has evolved in the 
period 2001–2012—on the basis of the longer relationship—through the wars of Iraq and 
Afghanistan and the NATO operations in Libya merit attention. Especially the roles of 
such categories as the political and strategic culture in the Special Relationship and the 
effects of shared values and interests are most important from a policy perspective for the 
United States, which, as President Obama’s words suggest, has come to rely on the 
persistence of this Special Relationship as the crisis-driven twenty-first century 
continues. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The leading basic questions that this research will explore include the following: 
• Is the Special Relationship fact or fiction, romanticism or strategy, myth 
or reality in the twenty-first century, and if it is a myth, who, how and why 
has it been created and to what ends? 
• What is the role of this relationship in U.S.-UK relations in security and 
defense and how does it reveal itself in the twenty-first century? 
• What are the personalities, forces, traditions, interests, and institutions at 
the heart of the Special Relationship?  
 4 
• How do critics of Anglo-American relations in the United Kingdom view 
the Special Relationship, and what of these dissenting views should be of 
note to makers of U.S. policy? 
The Special Relationship is and will continue to be of utmost significance to 
NATO and to the two partners, as was most powerfully evident in the first half of 2011 
with the Libyan campaign, as well as in the Iraqi and Afghan campaigns considered 
herein. The common values, interests, and institutions shared by the United States and the 
United Kingdom will be the basis by which the relationship remains close and 
cooperative. There is no doubt that each of the three case studies detailed in this thesis 
will reveal certain aspects of the relationship that are negative, as is the nature of any 
bilateral relationship in the international system where interests diverge apart from 
rhetoric and tradition. However, this thesis will argue, the staying power of the 
relationship will remain intact, due to the shared attitudes and interests of the two 
countries amid a more hostile world in which the power of the West is contested from old 
and new challenges and threats.  
The case studies of Iraq and Afghanistan in the past ten years seek to define the 
character of the Special Relationship and its role in times of war from a distinctly British 
perspective. The evolution of British policy and strategy during these two wars and how 
policy and strategy has changed or has stayed the same in the wake of different 
personalities and circumstances is of primary importance.  
The case study of Libya in 2011 seeks to explore whether the challenge the 
Western intervention there presents and redefines aspects of the Special Relationship and 
other NATO partners, i.e. France and Germany? Are there going to be any changes or 
refinements to the making of strategy, as well as such subordinate themes of alliance 
cohesion as information sharing, and other operational approaches are taken in the future, 
especially in light of the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates having predicted at the 
start of the Libyan campaign that NATO was on its death bed?  
This study will consider, in addition to official policy statement and strategic 
decisions, the role of personality and collective personalities within the statecraft and 
policy of the Special Relationship. Just how fraternal is Churchill’s association of 
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English-speaking peoples (whose differences had also inspired some famous quotes 
attributed to Sir Winston)?  And to what extent does it depend on the personal attention 
of politicians on both sides of “the pond”?  Thus, the research will explore leading 
personalities at the macro-level, for example President George W. Bush and Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, as a way of analyzing policy and strategy during the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan and the Libyan operation. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The nature and character of the Special Relationship is analyzed here chiefly in an 
historical treatment from the works of the most important authors in the area of Anglo-
American relations. The main authors include John Baylis, D. Cameron Watt, Alan P. 
Dobson, John Dumbrell, William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull. The main works in the 
field are: Anglo-American Defense Relations, 1939–1984: The Special Relationship by 
John Baylis; Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: of Friendship, Conflict 
and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers by Alan P. Dobson; A Special Relationship: 
Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq by John Dumbrell; Succeeding 
John Bull: America in Britain’s Place, 1900–1975: a Study of the Anglo-American 
Relationship and World Politics in the Context of British and American Foreign-Policy-
Making in the Twentieth Century by Donald Cameron Watt; and The “Special 
Relationship”: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 by William Roger Louis and 
Hedley Bull—among a wide literature that is enumerated in detail below.2 
Watt’s book, which covers Anglo-American relations from 1900 until 1975, 
explores the foreign-policy–making groups on each side of the Atlantic, paying particular 
attention to the “foreign-policy–making elites” (which he studies as an historian and not a 
                                                
2 John Baylis, Anglo-American Defense Relations 1939–1984, (New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1984); 
Alan P. Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise 
and Decline of Superpowers, (Oxon: Routledge,1995); John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-
American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); D. Cameron 
Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place, 1900–1975: a Study of the Anglo-American 
Relationship and World Politics in the Context of British and American Foreign-Policy-Making in the 
Twentieth Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); and William Roger Louis and Hedley 
Bull, ed., The “Special Relationship”: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986). 
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political scientist) and their attitudes and perceptions in policy-making.3  Dumbrell’s 
book speaks to the Special Relationship as a matter of shared culture and addresses “the 
resilience of the closeness, not its demise” in the early twenty-first century.4 Such a 
generalization speaks to the role of values in the making of foreign policy, a theme that is 
central to the study at hand and which represents a signal aspect of democracy and 
security in the past and present as well as a source of contention among critics of such 
statecraft in their number. The book is significant, as well, because it characterizes the 
early phase of the Iraq Campaign in 2002–2004 and the personalities involved in both the 
United States and the United Kingdom in the decision to go to war in 2003.5  The 
discussion of shared values and culture described in the book from an analytical center of  
gravity in the present study as well as an important area for reflection and analysis among 
those actively involved in the strategic affairs and operational details of the Special 
Relationship in the here and now.  
Baylis’s book provides a part of the necessary background for the thesis by 
discussing the Special Relationship since the beginning of the Second World War in 
terms of defense cooperation, which Baylis argues is only one dimension of the 
relationship—but is one of the shared interests at the very core of the special relationship. 
Of the four main areas of defense relations, which include (a) The Strategic Relationship, 
(b) The Technical Relationship, (c) The Operational Relationship, and (d) The 
Economic/Commercial Relationship,  discussed in the book, the focus for this thesis will 
be on the Political/Strategic Relationship, which includes both the bilateral relations of 
the U.S.-UK and their relations within the multilateral context, i.e., NATO.6  
Dobson’s book will assist in constructing the basic foundation of the elements of 
the Special Relationship. Dobson, a senior lecturer at University College Swansea, 
explores the defense, economic, and foreign policies of the United States and the United 
Kingdom from around 1900 until 1995 assessing the value and longevity of the 
                                                
3 Watt, Succeeding John Bull, 2–20. 
4 Dumbrell, A Special Relationship, 6.  
5 Ibid., 154–159, 210–215. 
6 Baylis, Anglo-American Defense Relations, xviii–xix. 
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relationship to be based on shared beliefs and values.7. Along with these other studies, 
Louis and Bull’s book is a necessary volume in the history of U.S.-UK relations. The 
book includes the historical, economic, and defense aspects of the relationship, with each 
chapter written by scholars in the field of Anglo-American relations.8  
The chapter of this thesis that focuses on British politics will be derived from 
several sources of key import to this chapter will be the 2009–2010 British Parliament’s 
House of Commons report on U.S.-UK relations, which covers the key areas of 
cooperation within the relationship, the British political approach to UK-U.S. relations, 
and the future of the relationship. It concludes that the “United Kingdom has an 
extremely close and valuable relationship with the U.S.”9  In the same vein, Chatham 
House’s report on UK Foreign Policy: Statements by the Three Main Political Parties, 
from 2010, offers policy highlights from all three major UK political parties, to include 
party manifestos. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The thesis will be written as a contemporary historical study of British policy and 
strategy; that is, policy analysis through historical monographs as well as works of 
contemporary history on a more or less scholarly basis, as well as public government 
documents. This thesis will proceed in a chronological manner, to begin with the Special 
Relationship in the early twentieth century and continuing through the present day, 2011. 
To be sure, the major portion of the thesis will be dedicated to the years 2001 through 
2011, when the three major cases took place. However, the chronological approach will 
help illuminate the evolution of the Special Relationship in the last ten years, as well as 
providing context for the changes that the case studies reveal.  
Some relevant and reliable online sources that will be incorporated into the thesis 
include, but are not limited to, the Chatham House Organization (The Royal Institute of 
                                                
7 Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century, 168. 
8 Louis and Bull, The Special Relationship, vi–xi. 
9 Great Britain, Global Security: UK-US Relations: Government Response to the Committee's Sixth 
Report of Session 2009-10: Third Special Report of Session 2009-10. (London: Stationery Office, 2010).  
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International Affairs, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/), and British public documents to 
include the Iraq Inquiry (http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/), which examines British 
involvement in the War in Iraq and the circumstances leading up to the 2003 invasion. 
The British political party websites will also be consulted in crafting the thesis: The 
Conservative Party (http://www.conservatives.com/), The Liberal Democratic (LibDems) 
Party (http://www.libdems.org.uk/home.aspx), and the Labour Party 
(http://www.labour.org.uk/).  
Such contemporary, mainstream British media sources as the BBC, the Telegraph 
(London), the Times (London), and the Independent (London), will be incorporated into 
the thesis. Each media outlet has a distinct perspective on domestic politics and foreign 
relations, given each media outlet’s political affiliations, and will provide updated views 
of each of the political parties as the events in the thesis took place. The Telegraph is a 
politically conservative newspaper, while the Times, traditionally a Conservative party 
supporter, came out for the Labour party during the 2001 and 2005 general elections. In  
2010, the Times voted for the Conservative party. Although the Independent does not 
pledge its support to any one British political party, the Independent leans towards the 
Liberal Democratic Party.  
In addition to the major works cited in the literature review, other authors will be 
considered on the topic, to include John Lamberton Harper, Wallace J. Thies, Anand 
Menon, Ryan C. Hendrickson, and William Wallace, in addition to the main scholarly 
works of John Baylis, John Dumbrell, Alan P. Dobson, D. Cameron Watt, William Roger 
Louis and Hedley Bull. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into seven chapters. The first chapter consists of the 
introduction, detailing how the thesis will proceed. The second chapter addresses the 
historical background of the Special Relationship by briefly examining two periods in 




day, 2011. The second part of the second chapter will discuss the foundations of the 
Special Relationship, notably the shared values, traditions, and institutions of the United 
States and the United Kingdom.  
The third chapter will address the three major British political parties 
(Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, and Labour) and the British perspective on the 
Special Relationship. British domestic politics is linked to the foreign policy decisions of 
the government of the United Kingdom and is therefore necessary to discuss in relation to 
the Special Relationship.  
Chapters IV through VI will explore the cases of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, 
respectively, by examining the relevant events and personalities in the United States and 
the United Kingdom and tracing the changing (and unchanging) aspects of the special 
relationship from the British perspective. Exploring how the values, traditions, and 
interests have evolved or remained the same throughout the three cases is of utmost 
significance.  
The final chapter/conclusion will focus on the British perspective of the special 
relationship to discuss the similarities and differences between the three case studies, 
address how the special relationship has evolved, and address how and why the special 
relationship will endure in the twenty-first century from the point of view of the British. 
 10 
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II. HISTORY OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On 5 March in 1946, Winston Churchill made his Sinews of Peace Address at 
Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. He thereby made the first reference to the 
Special Relationship. He said: “Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous 
rise of world organization will be gained without what I have called the fraternal 
association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between 
the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States.”10  Although U.S.-UK 
diplomatic relations as sovereign nation states can be traced to the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, Churchill’s speech and coining of the phrase Special Relationship 
solidified the post war bilateral relationship between the United States and the United 
Kingdom into the Euro-Atlantic and International system of states in a manner that 
contrasted with the discord that operated in the era after 1919 until 1941.  
The Special Relationship has been a partnership built on common values and 
institutions between the two nation-states, to include cultural, economic, political, 
diplomatic, security, and military facets and aspects. The Special Relationship has not 
always had an easy road to travel given the circumstances of war, peace, and change over 
the last century in which the United Kingdom lost its empire and the United States 
acquired a sphere of influence and a role of leadership in the era of total war. After the 
Second World War, the Special Relationship became closer for a number of reasons, one 
of which was the threat posed by the Soviets to Euro-Atlantic security. It was during this 
time that Britain proved to be “one of the most stalwart of America’s European allies” 
and moreover, “the one best-placed to support the United States within and outside the 
Atlantic area.”11  However, with the cooling of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall,  
 
 
                                                
10 Churchill, “The Sinews of Peace Address.” 
11 Great Britain, Global Security: UK-U.S. Relations, 11; Dumbrell, The Special Relationship, 4. 
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and the end of the communism on the European continent, the post-modern world has 
created a new international order in which new allies and adversaries challenge the long-
standing Special Relationship.  
This thesis analyzes the Special Relationship as an unparalleled bilateral 
relationship between two of the most powerful nation-states in the world with a common 
history of cooperation over one hundred years in the making. The shared traditions, 
values, institutions, and personalities form the foundation for the analysis, depicting the 
very essence of the Special Relationship in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The 
Special Relationship under the leadership of President George W. Bush and Prime 
Minister Tony Blair during the Iraq Conflict provides a worthwhile case study detailing a 
period of time wherein U.S.-UK relations were tested and tried in both the Euro-Atlantic 
and International arenas. The British perceptions of the relationship during the period of 
2003 through 2007 reflect both favorable and unfavorable critiques as well as notions of 
the greater European anti-Americanism, primarily the French and British variant, which 
have revealed the strength of the Special Relationship in the midst of negative attitudes 
and perspectives toward the United States. Despite the claims of U.S. unilateralism, 
protectionism, and isolationism, the Special Relationship endures as an example of a 
successful partnership that remains an integral and fundamental part of Euro-Atlantic and 
International relations. 
B. BACKGROUND ON THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP:  TRADITIONS, 
VALUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND PERSONALITIES   
The Special Relationship is founded on a rich history of shared values, traditions, 
and institutions in which personalities have played an exceptionally important role in how 
the partnership has been conducted and how it has operated throughout the history of the 
Special Relationship. The ideals and values of democracy, individual rights, rule of law, 
and free will all account for the primary foundation upon which the Special Relationship 
has been built upon.  
The Special Relationship is a unique partnership built on common values and 
ideals that span a number of ties and connections across the board from cultural and 
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historical ties to security and defense related connections and institutions. These common 
values became the cornerstone for the Special Relationship and thus, for the institutions 
created and shared by the United States and the United Kingdom which reflected these 
values, to include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United 
Nations (UN), among others.12 
With its origins in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries through the relations 
between the United States and Britain, the Special Relationship of the modern era came 
into existence during the Second World War and was formally recognized in Churchill’s 
address, Sinews of Peace. The interactions between Churchill and President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt (FDR) during the Second World War revealed the true nature of the modern 
Special Relationship and how personalities, policies, and agreements played an important 
role in establishing the partnership and how it would proceed from this period onward. 
An example of Churchill and FDR’s cooperation is detailed in John Lamberton Harper’s 
book, American Visions of Europe, wherein U.S.-UK relations are characterized by the 
bilateral agreements signed by the two leaders in an effort to combat the threats that 
affected both countries.13  These included the Quebec Agreement and the Hyde Park 
Agreement, which dealt with the exchange of information regarding atomic power.14 
The historical character and nature of the Special Relationship is of particular 
interest. In the late 1890s, a series of events occurred, to include the Boer and Spanish 
American Wars, which let Britain and the World know that the United States wanted its 
own place in the International arena as well as demonstrated that the place of the British 
Empire was far from certain on the eve of the twentieth century. After the First World 
War and most certainly after the Second World War, there was a shift of power from the 
British to the Americans making the Americans the dominant partner in U.S.-UK 
relations.  
                                                
12 See Ian Q.R. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination, (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1997); Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO, 
(Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2003); and Ryan C. Hendrickson, Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary 
General and Military Action after the Cold War (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2006). 
13 John Lamberton Harper, American Visions of Europe (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 109–111.  
14 Harper, American Visions of Europe, 109–111. 
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Dr. Robin Niblett of Chatham articulated this point, in 2009, in his written 
testimony to the House of Commons on the basis and nature of the UK-U.S. relationship. 
He stated “successive British Governments realized that they no longer had the capacity 
to protect or project British interests around the world, and acquiesced in the replacement 
of Britain by the United States as the world’s dominant power.”15  Furthermore, “the 
United Kingdom believed that the most direct threat to British and European security—
that of the Soviet military aggression and/or political subversion—could only be 
confronted if the United States were tightly woven into a transatlantic alliance whose 
principal focus was the defense of Europe and the broader Atlantic community.”16 
The First World War made the United States from a debtor into a creditor, and 
rendered the multilateral issue of war debts among the victors and the defeated into an 
issue of statecraft, which equated financial power to world power.17  The United States 
provided countries in need with money and when the war was over, Britain, among 
others, was indebted to the United States.18  During the Second World War, the United 
States was once again the provider of loans to countries who required funds, thereby, 
establishing the U.S.’s place in the international arena through financial power.19   
In 1919, in the period following the First World War, “Anglo-American relations 
had been cool and often suspicious,” according to British historian, David Reynolds.20  
Reynolds sums up the period of the 1920s and 1930s quite succinctly by stating, 
“America’s ‘betrayal’ of the League of Nations was only the first in a series of U.S. 
actions—over war debts, naval rivalry, the 1931–1932 Manchurian crisis, and the 
Depression—that convinced British leaders that the United States could not be relied 
                                                
15 Great Britain, Global Security: UK-US Relations, 11. 
16 Ibid.  
17 Kathleen Burk, “Old World, New World: Great Britain and America from the beginning,” in 
America’s ‘Special Relationships’: Foreign and Domestic Aspects of the Politics of Alliance, edited by 
John Dumbrell and Axel R. Schafer (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 34. 
18 Burk, “Old World, New World,” 34.  
19 Ibid.  
20 David Reynolds, “1940: Fulcrum of the Twentieth Century?,” International Affairs, 66:2  (1990), 
331. 
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upon.”21 However, the result of events in 1940, namely the realization by the British that 
fighting a war alone was not an option and a closer relationship with the United States 
was necessary for a favorable outcome.22 
The Second World War began a tradition of junior and senior partners in an 
alliance, as was portrayed by the role of the Americans and British in military and policy 
making circles as well as between the personalities in command both politically and 
militarily.23  The example of George Marshall and Ernest Bevin in the founding of 
NATO along with the role of U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson in supporting the 
transatlantic alliance loom large in the bonds established by the United States and United 
Kingdom not only in a transatlantic alliance of junior to senior partner, but in the makings 
of new institutions based on the principles of the Special Relationship.24 The role of the 
United States as the senior partner became solidified through the events of the 1950s–
1970s and has continued as such until the present day.  
During the Second World War, the “Anglo-American cooperation grew out of a 
sense of shared threat and mutual need.”25  The shared traditions between both countries 
aided in solidifying the alliance. A shared tradition of liberal, capitalist democracy and a 
shared language were some of these traditions.26  During the Cold War era, the United 
States–UK relationship continued to flourish given the fact that the United States and the 
United Kingdom were diametrically opposed to the Soviet Union and communism. They 
continued cooperating in the sphere intelligence with the signed of the UK-U.S. 
Agreement of 1947, in addition to “naval cooperation and alliance on the ground in the 
                                                
21 David Reynolds, “1940: Fulcrum of the Twentieth Century,” 331. 
22 Ibid., 332.  
23 Mark A. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. 
Strategy in World War II, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2000), 120–122. 
24 Thies, Friendly Rivals, 46.  
25 David Reynolds, “Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Wartime Anglo-American. Alliance, 1939–1945: 
Towards a New Synthesis,” in William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, ed., The ‘Special Relationship’: 
Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1986), 39.  
26 Reynolds, “Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Wartime Anglo-American Alliance,” 39.  
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Korean War.”27  U.S. air bases in the United Kingdom that served as “staging posts to re-
supply American forces in Germany as well as for conventional and nuclear bombers to 
deter a Soviet advance across Germany, made the United Kingdom a crucial factor in 
maintaining a link between the North American continent and the renewed U.S. 
commitment to European defense.”28  The United Kingdom provided the “geographic as 
well as political ‘bridge’ between the American and European continents, holding the 
newly-imagined Atlantic Community together.”29 
While British scholars such as John Dumbrell promote the notion of a parent-and-
child relationship to describe the Special Relationship, such others as Douglas Hurd, the 
former British Foreign Secretary, prefer to characterize the Special Relationship as one of 
partners, where each partner has a role as either the junior or senior partner.30,31 The idea 
of the Special Relationship as a partnership of junior to senior is of utmost importance in 
the twenty-first century, given the circumstances surrounding the Special Relationship 
during the Iraq War, specifically with the advent of the perception of the British 
government as a “poodle” to the U.S. administration and how personalities played into 
this perception.32 
Although the role of personalities forms only one part of the greater Special 
Relationship, such personalities play a central role in how the alliance is carried out 
through the events and crises it has repeatedly faced. In 2006, the British Secretary of 
State for Defense, Liam Fox, characterized the Special Relationship with the following:   
The story of the Special Relationship can be depicted in light and 
attractive colors: the triumph of noble ideals, sacrifices rewarded, 
friendships forged and not forgotten. Together, America and Britain have 
                                                
27 William Wallace and Tim Oliver, “A Bridge Too Far:  The United Kingdom and the Transatlantic 
Relationship,” in David M. Andrews, ed., The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress:  US-European Relations 
after Iraq (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 154. 
28 Wallace and Oliver, A Bridge Too Far, 155. 
29 Ibid.  
30 John Dumbrell, “Hating Bush, supporting Washington: George W. Bush, anti-Americanism and the 
U.S.-UK special relationship” in America’s ‘Special Relationships’: Foreign and Domestic Aspects of the 
Politics of Alliance, ed., John Dumbrell and Axel R. Schafer (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 47-48.  
31 Great Britain, Global Security: UK-US Relations, 63. 
32 Ibid.,6. 
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helped remake much of the world in the image of liberty and democracy. 
The rule of law, rights of property, respect for individual rights—these 
formative ideas have transformed the prospects of nations that lived in the 
darkness of fear and despair.33 
One of the essential elements of the “Special Relationship,” as described by Fox 
was that of “friendships forged and not forgotten.”34  This idea of friendships leads to an 
important aspect of the U.S.-UK relationship, which is that of personalities. Throughout 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, personalities on both sides of the Atlantic have 
had a positive effect and lasting impression on the relationship. Close friendships and 
working alliances between the countries’ leaders have been one of the hallmarks of the 
U.S.-UK relationship.  
Among the most notable personalities that depicted the Special Relationship after 
Churchill and FDR, were Prime Minister Anthony Eden and President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower; Prime Minister Harold MacMillan and President John F. Kennedy; Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher and President Ronald Reagan; Prime Minister Tony Blair 
and Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.35,36   
The events of 9/11 marked a turning point in the history of the Special 
Relationship. The war in Afghanistan and the subsequent war in Iraq were especially 
difficult on the Special Relationship both domestically and internationally. Throughout 
the aftermath of 9/11, the Special Relationship has undergone serious scrutiny from both 
sides of the Atlantic and from allies and enemies in the International arena. The case of 
Bush and Blair during the Iraq War illuminate how the traditions, values, institutions, and 
personalities of the Special Relationship cooperate and collaborate during one of the most 
important yet critiqued and televised events in modern Euro-Atlantic history.	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III. POLITICAL PARTIES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The three leading political parties in the United Kingdom, are also the largest, and 
these comprise the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, and the Liberal Democrat Party. 
This chapter treats the parties’ histories, along with their 2010 party manifestos, foreign 
policy philosophies, and postures on global security and reform of the international 
system. Such material is essential to understand these main political parties and their role 
in the British domestic and international political system. These factors ultimately affect 
the foreign policies and actions of the British government in bilateral relations and are 
essential for analysis by a U.S. officer entrusted with the execution of security and 
defense affairs. The British Parliament as the queen of all parliaments, and like the U.S. 
Congress, is center of the United Kingdom’s democratic institution of government, and 
inevitably plays an important role in the decision-making and policy-making institutions 
of the government with international effects of the most profound kind.  
The United Kingdom is the world’s oldest parliamentary democracy. At the basis 
of any parliamentary system of government are the political parties that vie for positions 
of power throughout that system.37  Political parties are particularly important in the 
United Kingdom’s government, given that political parties in the United Kingdom are 
domestically, regionally, and internationally focused.38  Domestic politics and policy in 
the United Kingdom play a special role in the realization of international politics. 
Furthermore, the three major political parties of the United Kingdom, the Conservative 
Party, the Labour Party, and the Liberal Democrat Party are of importance to the  
 
 
                                                
37 Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver, and Peter Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe: 
Institutions, Parties, and Governments (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006), 187–189.  
38 The Royal Institute of International Affairs (RUSI) Chatham House, Rethinking the UK’s 
International Ambitions and Choices: UK Foreign Policy: Statements by the Three Main Political Parties 
(London: Chatham House, August 2010), 2–14.  
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discussion of the Special Relationship, given their ability to affect foreign policy 
decisions, by detailing each party’s primary preferences and stances towards the United 
States.39  
B. THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY 
The Conservative Party is the “oldest political party in the world” and has its 
origins in the seventeenth century, under the Tories.40  In the mid-1830s, Sir Robert Peel 
“reinterpreted key elements of the Tory tradition to create the modern Conservative 
Party, and led a reforming government” which brought in social reforms.41  In the 1860s, 
Benjamin Disraeli further reformed the Conservative Party by adding “national and social 
unity to the Party’s fundamental purposes.”42  Under Lord Salisbury and Alfred Balfour, 
the Conservative Party was reformed again and focused on “empowering individuals and 
communities.”43 
In the twenty-first century, the Conservative Manifesto proposes the following:  
A stronger Britain in a safer world: A Conservative government will 
defend our national security and support our brave Armed Forces in 
everything they do. We will promote our national interest with an active 
foreign policy. We will work constructively with the EU, but we will not 
hand over any more areas of power and we will never join the Euro. We 
will honor our aid commitments and make sure this money works for the 
poorest nations.44 
William Hague, the current British First Secretary and Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, presented the five key tenets for future Conservative 
                                                
39 The Royal Institute of International Affairs (RUSI) Chatham House, Rethinking the UK’s 
International Ambitions and Choices: UK Foreign Policy: Statements by the Three Main Political Parties, 
(London: Chatham House, August 2010), 2–14.  





44 “The Conservative Manifesto 2010: Invitation to Join the Government of Britain,” Conservative 
Party, 13 April 2010, accessed 31 October 2011, http://www.conservatives.com/Policy/Manifesto.aspx, 
103. 
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foreign policy in a number of speeches between 2007 and 2010,  “A major reform of 
decision-making in foreign policy, a renewed commitment to the transatlantic alliance, 
the cementing of relationships with old allies and the elevation of links with new 
partners, the reform and development of international institutions, including the European 
Union, and the upholding of our values.”45  Throughout his speeches in 2009 and 2010, 
Hague revealed his major commitment to the transatlantic alliance.  
Regarding the topic of global security and reform of the international system on 
the nature of twenty-first century power and threats, the Conservative Party states,  
We no longer inhabit a world in which foreign and defense issues can be 
separated from domestically-generated threats. Instead we live in a world 
in which dangers, events and actions abroad are independent with threats 
to our security at home. We must meet the threats we face with a 
concerted response from the state. That response cannot just come from 
how we conduct our foreign affairs, or organize our defense and internal 
security - it must cut across energy, education, community cohesion, 
health, technology, international development and the environment too.46 
Conservative party members who served in British government positions during 
the last ten years include David Cameron, the current Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom, who assumed office on 11 May 2010 and also serves as the current Leader of 
the Conservative Party, and William Hague, British First Secretary and Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from 10 May 2010 until the present. 
C. THE LABOUR PARTY 
In 1900, “working people, trade unionists, and socialists, united by the goal of 
changing the British Parliament to represent the interests of everybody,” founded the 
                                                
45 Chatham House, 6. William Hague’s quotation, which is detailed above is documented in the 
Chatham House document on page 6, along with additional information on speeches given in 2007 and 
2009. The information on the speeches are cited verbatim from the Chatham House document: “William 
Hague, The Foreign Policy Framework of a New Conservative Government, speech at the Royal United 
Services Institute (RUSI), London, 10 March 2010. For an earlier exposition of the five themes see: 
William Hague, ‘The Future of British Foreign Policy with a Conservative Government,’ speech at the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 21 July 2009 and William Hague, ‘Thinking Ahead: 
The Foreign Policy Of The Next Conservative Government,’ speech at Chatham House, London, 31 
January 2007.” 
46 “The Conservative Manifesto 2010.”  
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Labour Party as part of the socialist movement of the late nineteenth century in the wake 
of industrialization and the failures of liberals in the second half of the same century.47  
Throughout the last one hundred years, the Labour Party has been involved in the 
“establishment of the National Health Service, the enshrining in law of equality of 
opportunity for all and the creation and maintenance of an empowering welfare state.”48 
The Labour party also played a central role in the anti-communism of the early Cold War, 
and the foundation of the Atlantic alliance. As such, it has a major stake in the special 
relationship begun under the conservative Winston Churchill.  
In the twenty-first century, the Labour Party is committed to “the challenge for 
Britain: To harness our strengths and values, as we develop Britain’s world role in a 
global era, using our alliances and networks in order to promote security, economic 
prosperity, development and to safeguard the environment.”49  With respect to the  
Foreign Policy philosophy of the Labour Party, Gordon Brown’s speech in 2007 
highlights the party’s philosophy of “hard-headed internationalism.”50 Brown stated that 
his approach was  
… internationalist because global challenges need global solutions and 
nations must cooperate across borders - often with hard-headed 
intervention - to give expression to our shared interests and shared values; 
- hard-headed because we will not shirk from the difficult long term 
decisions and because only through reform of our international rules and 
institutions will we achieve concrete, on-the-ground results.51 
On the topic of global security and reform of the international system, the Labour 
party contends the following: “Human rights and democracy are a central feature of our 
foreign policy for a simple reason—we believe human rights are universal and it is the 
                                                
47 “History of the Labour Party,” Labour Party, accessed 31 October 2011, 
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50 Chatham House, 2. 
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job of strong and mature democracies to support the development of free societies 
everywhere—while upholding our own legal and moral obligations.”52  
Labour Party members who served in British government positions during the last 
ten years include Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, who was in office 
from 2 May 1997 until 27 June 2007, during which time he served as the leader of the 
Labour Party; Gordon Brown, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, who was in office 
from 27 June 2007 until 11 May 2010, when he served as the leader of the Labour Party; 
and David Miliband, the UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
who was in office from 28 June 2007 to 11 May 2010 and had previously served as the 
United Kingdom Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.  
D. THE LIBERAL DEMOCRAT PARTY  
The Liberal Democrat Party originated in 1988 with the merger between the 
Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party.53 The Liberal party has a long tradition in 
British politics, reaching back to the early nineteenth century. The Liberal Democrat 
Party is considered to be the center party between the Conservative and Labour parties. In 
2010, the Liberal Democrat Party manifesto stated, “Britain must work together with our 
partners abroad if we are to have the best hope of meeting the challenges the world faces. 
We believe in freedom, justice, prosperity and human rights for all and will do all we can 
to work towards a world where these hopes become reality.”54 
The Liberal Democrat Party is “wary of the implications of a ‘subservient 
relationship with the United States.,” an attitude that recalls a school of policy in British 
statecraft since at least the Suez debacle in 1956 when the United States could be said to 
have pulled the rug out from under its Anglo-Saxon ally over Nasser and the canal.55  In 
2010, in a speech at Chatham House, Liberal Democrat Nick Clegg suggested that “what 
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Publishing, 2001), 145. 
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Britain requires is “self-confidence, a rebalanced partnership with the United States, a 
repatriated foreign policy which is in British interests alone, articulated through a strong, 
united and forceful EU.”56   
Regarding global security and reform of the international system, the Liberal 
Democrat party manifesto proposal states it will 
… support efforts to create an International Arms Trade Treaty; will 
establish a ‘code of conduct’ for arms brokers; propose a ‘full judicial 
inquiry into allegations of British complicity in torture and state 
kidnapping’; the only party to rule out military action in Iran, instead 
placing an emphasis on diplomatic engagement; and committed to the 
two-state solution for Israel-Palestine, and acting through the EU to ‘put 
pressure on Israel and Egypt to end the blockade of Gaza.’57 
Liberal Democrat Party members who served in British government positions 
during the last ten years include Nicholas “Nick” Clegg, the current Deputy Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom, who assumed office on 11 May 2010 and also serves as 
Lord President of the Council, Minister for Constitutional and Political Reform, and as 
leader of the Liberal Democrat Party, and Edward Davey, who assumed office on 20 May 
2010 as the UK Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills. 
E. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, and the Liberal Democrat 
Party together provide an invaluable service to the British government and its people by 
the articulation of their party platforms and manifestos. Each parties’ attention to 
domestic, regional, and international issues provides the necessary foundation from 
which the British government and its people are able to identify and coalesce those 
aspects of international policy, security, and defense each are willing to agree on and feel 
the government should participate in to function coherently and comprehensively, 
according to the norms of British politics and society.  
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Political parties are an important part of British policy and statecraft in which 
parties are able to affect the international world order and most specifically, in this case, 
that of the Special Relationship. Whether the British government and its people choose to 
support or challenge the status quo of an agreement or alliance is, for the most part, in the 
hands of the political parties who are able to garner the support needed for such an action.  
The most recent example of the political parties ability to affect international 
norms and alliances came in May 2010, when newly appointed Prime Minister David 
Cameron and Deputy Prime Minister Clegg signed the Coalition Agreement, a combined 
Conservative party and Liberal Democrat party program for the British government for 
the next five years.58  In the Coalition Agreement, relations between the United Kingdom 
and the United States are among the ten priorities in the Foreign Affairs portion of the 
document.59  The intent of the current British government is on maintaining “a strong, 
close, and frank relationship with the United States.”60 The acknowledgement by the two 
parties of the British Coalition government is an indication of the continued commitment 
of the United Kingdom in the Special Relationship with the United States and 
furthermore, an indication of the power of political parties in Britain. 
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On 20 March 2003, the United States and the United Kingdom invaded Iraq 
opening a new and troubling chapter in the Special Relationship. The invasion was based 
on official allegations of Iraq’s ability to employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
(later disproven by fact), which inevitably posed a direct threat to the United States and 
the United Kingdom in the post 11 September 2001 cosmos of war and peace. The Iraq 
War, which defied the efforts of United States and United Kingdom planners to predict 
its outcome, prove to be a pivotal event in the history of the Special Relationship. 
Exploring some British perceptions of the Special Relationship during the Iraq War gives 
a view of the Special Relationship from the standpoint of the junior partner, which 
supported the senior partner resolutely through an unpopular war from the standpoint of 
the British public.  
The protraction and problems of the Iraq War placed a heavy burden on the 
Special Relationship. In this chapter, the Special Relationship will be revealed from the 
viewpoint of the Blair-Bush Relationship, the Brown–Bush Relationship, and the 
inquiries conducted by the Government of the United Kingdom from 2009 and 2010. 
Those inquiries addressed the nature, perceptions, and role of the Special Relationship 
during the Iraq War.  
B. THE BLAIR–BUSH RELATIONSHIP 
In the wake of the bin Laden assault on the United State’s east coast, the Special 
Relationship became closer. Prime Minister Blair’s understanding of the trauma and 
impact of 9/11 on the American people and his shared vision of democracy in the Middle 
East to be achieved by defusing the fundamentalist Islamic threat, made the Blair-Bush 
bond closer than the era of accord of the Blair-Clinton bond.61  According to the 
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Telegraph, Blair and Bush agreed on the issues of terrorism and Iraq and reported 
“Britain’s support has never been more appreciated.”62  In the same article, however, the 
Telegraph reported that the failures of Blair to “win favors from Washington in return did 
more to undermine the Special Relationship in the eyes of the British public than 
anything else since Suez.”63  Although it is clear that Blair was doing his best to support 
Bush in what was understood as an international threat, his domestic support was 
dwindling for various reasons and his ability effectively to act as a partner in a bilateral 
relationship was questioned, both during his time in office and after. 
According to John Dumbrell, “Blair’s commitment to Washington’s War on 
Terror was controversial and highly personal. The Special Relationship, however, 
provided the context for the commitment.”64   
1. The “Inevitable” United Kingdom Support for War 
Various British scholars have argued the word “inevitable” should not be used in 
the case of British support to the United States. They state that the idea of British support 
to the War in Iraq as “inevitable” is incorrect and misleading given the case of the 
Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982, an event that had slipped from the minds of most but 
illustrated the Reagan Thatcher chapter of the Special Relationship three decades ago. 
During the Falklands/Malvinas war, the United States did not initially support British 
military objectives, citing the conflict as a modern manifestation of Britain’s imperial 
past and also as a manifestation of divergences within the U.S. foreign policy 
establishment, especially between the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeanne 
Kirkpatrick, as a leading Latin Americanist, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar 
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Weinberger as a representative in said epoch of the Special Relationship.65  During that 
time, the Reagan administration’s Latin Americanist faction was vying for neutrality and 
therefore was not willing to get involved in the conflict.66  It was only later in the conflict 
that the United States sided with the United Kingdom due to its military and intelligence 
agreements, but the United States did not send ground troops to assist the British military 
in the Falkands.67   Another factor in 1982 was the question of NATO cohesion at the 
time of the intermediate nuclear forces crisis, at which time the humiliation of the United 
Kingdom would have damaged NATO in the face of Soviet missiles.  
The Falklands/Malvinas War revealed the inability of the United Kingdom to act 
independently from the United States in its own conflicts. However, given the realization 
of U.S. support during the Falklands war, neither the United Kingdom nor the United 
States, given the United Kingdom’s lack of support during the Vietnam conflict, were to 
assume either would necessarily come to the other’s rescue or assistance during a conflict 
or war.68  In the post Cold-War environment of the 1990s, and especially in the twenty-
first century, the Special Relationship would be strikingly different from what it had been 
during the Vietnam and Falklands/Malvinas wars.  
Given the result of the Falklands/Malvinas War, support by the United States to 
the United Kingdom was not inevitable. Therefore, the question of why the United 
Kingdom became involved in supporting the war in Iraq, in 2003 is of importance. The 
personal level of the Special Relationship is that Blair’s support to the United States was 
part of his own understanding of UK policy towards the United States69  Although the 
U.S. would be recognized the world over as the principal ally of the United Kingdom, the 
relationship does not stipulate that the United Kingdom will respond automatically at the 
least demand by the U.S. to support its national objectives.70  
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2. Blair’s Mission, Priorities, and Perceptions 
The United Kingdom supported the United States in the second Gulf War of 
1990–1991, in the intervention in Afghanistan in 2001–2, and in the Iraq campaign in 
2003. Blair’s own mission, priorities, and perceptions of the Global War on Terror and, in 
this case, the Iraq War, were indicative of the practice of the Special Relationship, both 
domestically and internationally. Blair proved his loyalty at home as an ardent supporter 
of the U.S., and internationally, most notably, by the consistent support to the United 
States in the UN Security Council in a decisive phase when the French defected to the 
German-Russian pact against the Bush policies.71 
The Special Relationship continued to endure at the practical and operational 
level throughout the years; even when at times the strategic and personal levels were not 
at their best. Dumbrell points to the facet of military and intelligence cooperation within 
the greater Special Relationship as an important part of the relationship, but plainly not 
the reason for fighting wars on each other’s behalf.72  Furthermore, Dumbrell states, 
“Bureaucratic intertwining reinforces mutual cooperation. Yet intelligence sharing does 
not lead automatically to providing military support, especially in the extremely 
controversial circumstances of the 2003 Iraqi invasion.”73 Therefore, there needs to be 
another reason for the level of involvement by the United Kingdom in the Global War on 
Terror. The explanation lies in Blair himself and his idea of statecraft, intervention and 
the attempt to advance the interests of United Kingdom in the face of the French and the 
Germans within the EU.  
In explaining why Blair supported the United States for the Iraqi invasion, 
Dumbrell, and others, contend that it was a matter that “can only be explained in highly 
personal terms.”74  Blair’s policy “reflected his personal interpretation of ‘Special 
Relationship’ responsibilities.”75  Blair’s policy, therefore, was founded on the notion 
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that “British interests are best served by closeness between Britain and the Unites 
States.”76 As had been the case before, when speaking to the closeness of the Special 
Relationship and what the benefits were for the United Kingdom, Dumbrell states, 
“proximity to power allows Britain ‘to punch above its international weight.’”77  And this 
fact contrasts with the policies of Schroeder and Chirac in league with Putin in the years 
2002–2003, as well as the earlier episode of French-German ambivalence to Atlanticism 
in the 1960s and 1970s.  
However, British policymakers have seen “British influence as a good in itself; 
not only in terms of Britain’s global profile, but also in terms of substantive impacting  
[sic] on U.S. policy.”78  During the War on Terror, including the invasion of Iraq, Blair 
“saw strong British involvement in all aspects as a good in itself.”79  This “faith in the 
inherit benefits of British influence, extending beyond any narrow definition of the 
‘British interest,’ is a persistent, almost defining feature in British views of the Special 
Relationship.”80 
In the case of the Iraq War in 2003, the goal of the U.S. was regime change, 
“whereby evidence or the lack of it, regarding the existence of Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction or of any connection between Baghdad and 9/11, was secondary.”81  Blair’s 
priorities, however, were to “support America, to push Washington away from 
unilateralism and, if at all possible, to bring British and Western European opinion 
behind Washington.”82  
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Yet, another reason for Blair’s support came from “his personal conviction that 
Saddam Hussein’s regime was a threat to global security.”83   
Blair’s own perceptions of the Special Relationship during this time and the 
perceived “reasoning behind Blair’s reaction to Bush’s reaction to 9/11 was complex” 
and of utmost importance to defining the Special Relationship.84  There were three parts 
to Blair’s reasoning which were—(1) serving as the “Atlantic Bridge,” (2) the Greeks and 
Romans analogy to express British influence, and (3) Blair’s own beliefs, previously 
addressed, which included international change and world order.85 
In the first of the three components of Blair’s reasoning, the Prime Minister 
perceived his role as the “encourager of transatlantic mutuality,” which has been a tenet 
of British foreign and security policy more or less since 1941 or so.86  Through Blair, the 
transatlantic dialogue between Europe and the U.S. would continue to prosper and 
become closer in the face of new threats. Echoing the rhetoric and views of Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan in the era after Suez in the late 1950s, Blair pursued a 
strategy of “Greeks and Romans.”  Greeks were to symbolize the British and Romans to 
symbolize the Americans, to indicate how the British would influence American policy.87  
Through this component of the reasoning, Blair would press the U.S. for assistance and 
cooperation for his international agenda, which dealt with issues of multilateralism, the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and aid to Africa.88  
Lastly, Blair’s own beliefs became an important part of his reason for supporting 
the United States. Blair’s support was more than an issue of supporting “British 
obligations under the Special Relationship,” but about his own beliefs regarding 
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international change and world order.89  As was previously stated, Blair’s “decision for 
war stemmed from his genuine and profound apprehensions, which he certainly shared 
with Bush, about Saddam’s links with terrorism, and about the possibility of WMDs 
falling into terrorist hands,” as well as the “state of contemporary politics.”90 
3. Perceptions of the Bush Administration 
The position of the United States is somewhat ambiguous as to whether or not the 
United States wanted the United Kingdom involved in the Iraq invasion. The Republicans 
had embraced the principle of the mission defines the coalition, and stood with a 
skeptical or hostile attitude to the experience of NATO and its consultation and 
consensus.  While reports of Donald Rumsfeld’s comments to the British remain unclear 
regarding the U.S.’s ability to go forward without the British, as being helpful or hurtful, 
other sources within the Bush administration, including that of the President’s own 
rhetoric, offer insight into the divided government in Washington DC that subsumed the 
U.S. at the time of the Iraq invasion.91   
Dumbrell argues “Britain participated in the Iraq invasion despite President 
Bush’s explicit concern that Blair’s government would suffer politically.”92  That being 
said, “Blair was apparently given the explicit option of being involved only in an Iraqi 
‘second wave’ as ‘peacekeepers or something.’”93  The fact that Bush was cognizant of 
what participating in the invasion posed to Blair’s government is telling of his perhaps 
under appreciated insight into the dynamics of alliance cohesion. It speaks to role of Bush 
and his awareness of how Blair’s involvement in the Iraq invasion could mean troubles 
for both his government and his career. If Bush had not cared, why would he even speak 
to this point? Obviously, he did care, or at least he uttered the words, making it seem as if 
he did. Moreover, Bush showed his insights into the dimension of domestic politics as a 
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feature of alliance cohesion, in this case, as concerns the Janus faced behavior of the 
German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in 2001–2002. The latter did or did not promise 
Bush support in the face of a U.S. invasion of Iraq, and then mounted an anti-U.S. 
election campaign in the year 2002, which caused the collapse of the German–U.S. 
relationship in the pact of weasel’s rhetoric of 2003.   
The relationship between Blair and Bush has been characterized by an 
unprecedented level of intimacy between presidents and prime ministers in the policy 
decision-making process.94  However, the Blair-Bush relationship “exposed limits of 
British influence over American policy.”95   Dumbrell contends correctly and with clear 
insight that the role of the British Prime Minister in receiving aid to Africa or “altered 
attitudes towards climate change” in exchange for the support for the invasion, “betrayed 
both an exaggerated sense of Britain’s importance to the United States and an ignorance 
of the American politics of separated powers, wherein the U.S. Congress holds the purse-
strings and the U.S. Senate ratifies treaties.”96 
C. THE BROWN-BUSH RELATIONSHIP 
Blair’s resignation in disgrace as Prime Minister in late June 2007 ushered in a 
weakened socialist leadership in the United Kingdom less seized of foreign policy and 
soon to be ensnared in the world financial crisis. Gordon Brown became the new Prime 
Minister and his approach towards the Special Relationship was perceived as somewhat 
different from Blair’s. Beginning with the use of rhetoric in the media and during his 
speeches, Brown used different words and phrases to characterize the Special 
Relationship. Instead of using the phrase “the Special Relationship,” Brown insisted on 
depicting U.S.-UK relations in the form of a bilateral relationship.97  Rather than 
continuing to use Blair’s “bridge” to symbolize the UK’s role between Europe and the 
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United States, Brown decided to use the image of a beacon, stating “our British values 
should make us a beacon for Europe, America, and the rest of the world, building a pro-
Atlantic, pro-European consensus.”98  Brown continually spoke to the bonds between 
Europe and America versus those of the United States and the United Kingdom.99  That 
is, Brown, with his background in the treasury, had a more balanced sense of the role of 
the EU in British policy than his ill-fated predecessor in the mode of Churchill and 
Thatcher.  
Brown decided to make his separation from the former Prime Minister apparent in 
other ways as well. Upon becoming Prime Minister, Brown appointed various critics of 
the invasion of Iraq to prominent positions within his cabinet, to include John Denham, 
David Miliband, and Mark Malloch Brown.100  John Denham had served in the Blair 
Cabinet, however had resigned from his position over the issue of Iraq.101  David 
Miliband, who was a critic of the UK policy in Iraq, was made Foreign Secretary, and 
Mark Malloch Brown, the former UN Deputy Secretary General and ardent critic of the 
Bush administration, minister for foreign affairs.102   
The most visible example of Brown’s distance from the U.S. came from his first 
meeting with Bush in 2007.103  Not only had Brown already met with both Angela 
Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy prior to his meeting with Bush, (which signaled Brown’s 
role for the U.S. in relation to his European counterparts,) there was not the special 
personal connection between the two leaders that had been previously the case.104 
With Brown as Prime Minister, “close military and intelligence cooperation 
continued and the harmony of outlook on many international questions remained 
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constant” with the exception of Iraq.105  According to Dunn, the “UK government 
announced its intention to halve the British presence in Basra province and to withdraw 
the forces there to the air station in an ‘oversight’ role.”106  Brown “sought to compensate 
for it by announcing an increase of British troop numbers in Afghanistan.”107  His 
decisions in Iraq and Afghanistan reflected his government’s views on the wars. While 
the war in Afghanistan was being fought as the “good war,” the UK government 
remained ambiguous in its support for military action in Iraq.108  The perception of the 
United Kingdom as a “good and loyal ally” was maintained by the support of the United 
Kingdom in Afghanistan.109  While maintaining this appearance, Brown was able to 
lessen the UK government’s support to the war in Iraq.110  
However, Dunn concludes, “steps taken to signal distance were more 
presentational than substantive.”111  The Brown government kept military forces in Iraq, 
but with a “reduced mandate and role…they were neither fully withdrawn nor fully 
engaged.”112  This was indicative of the UK policy towards the United States at the 
strategic level, at which the British government found itself struggling to carry out its 
domestic and strategic objectives and policies.113  While attempting to be anti-Bush and 
pro-American, the Brown government was unsuccessful at both.114 
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D. THE ROLE OF THE INQUIRY: THE IRAQ INQUIRY AND THE HOUSE 
OF COMMONS UK-U.S. RELATIONS INQUIRY 
On 15 June 2009, Prime Minister Gordon Brown stated that an official inquiry on 
the lessons learned from the Iraq War would be conducted by the British government and 
chaired by Sir John Chilcot.115  The inquiry’s terms of reference included the following:  
“the period from the summer of 2001 to the end of July 2009, …the United Kingdom’s 
involvement in Iraq, including the way decisions were made and actions taken, to 
establish, as accurately as possible, what happened and to identify the lessons that can be 
learned.”116  The overall intent of the inquiry was to uncover the cause and effect of 
intervention in the Iraq War to “help ensure that, if we (the British Government) face 
similar situations in future, the government of the day is best equipped to respond to 
those situations in the most effective manner in the best interests of the country.”117  
Although the inquiry’s final report has not been written as of late 2011, nor has the 
inquiry been debated in Parliament, the testimonies and evidence given thus far in the 
inquiry suggest how decisions were made and the reasons behind those actions.  
In this regard, one of the most important decision-makers and personalities in the 
Iraq Inquiry has been Blair himself. His testimony on 29 January 2010, was particularly 
illuminating to the position of the United Kingdom in the Iraq War along with his own 
perceptions of the role of the United Kingdom in both the European system of nation-
states and the greater international system of states. During his interview, Blair stated that 
he would not have done anything differently in either the prelude to the Iraq War in 2002 
or during it in 2003.118  The former Prime Minister’s testimony during the Inquiry is 
indicative of the strong relationship between the two countries, and how given the chance 
to do it all again, the Prime Minister would act in the same manner in which he  
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had acted previously. Furthermore, the values and traditions of the Special Relationship 
are at the core of this argument for which Blair contended that the Iraqi people are today 
better off than they were under Saddam’s regime.119  
In July 2009, a second government inquiry was launched by the House of 
Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, to re-assess the state of the UK’s relationship 
with its “most important bilateral ally,” the United States.120  The Global Security, UK-
U.S. Relations Inquiry was regarded as the last in a series of inquiries by the House of 
Commons that began in 2001 and addressed the role of UK-U.S. relations since the 
events of 9/11.121  According to the Foreign Affairs Committee,   the fact that two 
inquiries within the British government, the Iraq Inquiry and the UK-U.S. Relations 
Inquiry, were being conducted at the same time, was purely coincidental.122  Each of the 
inquiries addressed separate issues and although there would be some small overlap, 
there would be no replication of work between the inquiries.123   
The role of the UK-U.S. Relations Inquiry, was to identify the “the relationship 
between the United Kingdom and the U.S., and the implications this has on foreign 
policy.”  Issues addressed in the Inquiry included the following:   
• the basis of the bilateral relationship between the United Kingdom 
and the U.S.;  
• United Kingdom and United States views on the nature and value 
of the bilateral relationship and the contribution of the UK-U.S. 
foreign policy relationship to global security;  
• the extent to which UK and U.S. interests align in key foreign 
policy related areas including security, defense, and intelligence 
cooperation;  
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• the extent to which the United Kingdom is able to influence U.S. 
foreign policy and UK policy is influenced by the United States 
under the Obama Administration;  
• the extent to which the Special Relationship still exists and the 
factors which determine this;  
• the implications of any changes in the nature of the bilateral 
relationship for British foreign policy.124 
Given the previous assertions and perceptions orchestrated to depict Britain as the 
subservient partner in the Special Relationship, a number of testimonies regarding the 
subject were considered and the Foreign Affairs Committee, concluded that,  
The perception that the British Government was a subservient “poodle”to 
the U.S. Administration leading up to the period of the invasion of Iraq 
and its aftermath is widespread both among the British public and 
overseas and that this perception, whatever its relation to reality, is deeply 
damaging to the reputation and interests of the United Kingdom.125 
With respect to the role of the leadership within the Special Relationship, the 
Foreign Affairs Committee “concluded that the Prime Minister/President relationship is 
an important aspect of the UK-U.S. relationship.”126  The Committee also concluded that 
it was “equally important to ensure that the United Kingdom does not conduct foreign 
policy on the basis of this relationship alone.”127  The Committee ended the topic of 
leadership by addressing the role of Ministers, Parliament and Congress by stating that 
“strong and enduring links are nurtured at the wider Ministerial level and between 
Parliament and Congress,” thus, giving credence to the role of other government policy-
makers and decision makers in each of the countries.128 
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1. The Role of the Junior Partner 
Another important dimension of leadership, as detailed by former foreign minister 
Douglas Hurd during his testimony, was the role of the junior partner. “He stated that 
neither Winston Churchill nor Margaret Thatcher was by nature or temperament a junior 
partner but they both learned reluctantly the art.”129  He contends that Blair did not learn 
the art of being the junior partner and confused it with subservience instead of 
subordination.130  From this subservience to the senior partner, came the notion of Britain 
as a “poodle” during the Iraq War. According to the transcripts of the Inquiry, the view of 
“British subservience” was not a unanimous sentiment by all the witnesses; however, it 
was important enough to be addressed throughout not only this Inquiry, but the Iraq 
Inquiry.131  
The UK-U.S. Relations Inquiry “concluded that there are many lessons to be 
learned from the UK’s political approach towards the United States in respect to the Iraq 
War.”132  Much is left to the Iraq Inquiry to reveal the nature of the conflict from all 
aspects of the UK government, however the UK-U.S. Relations Inquiry had its own 
conclusions to make, which dealt specifically with the role of perception of the British 
Government as a subservient “poodle.” A term that contrasted with the former glory of 
Britain as a world power and recalled the sense of betrayal of Suez in 1956, or the 
Skybolt Affair of 1962–3.  
The role of British influence in U.S. policy is of particular interest and has an 
important place in the context of the Iraq war, as well as the war in Afghanistan and the 
conflict in Libya. “British and European politicians have been over-optimistic about the 
extent of influence they have over the United States.”133 That being said, the Inquiry 
“recommend(ed) that the Government (United Kingdom) continues its informed and 
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measured approach to the United States whilst remaining mindful that the United States 
is, and will continue to be, Britain’s most important ally.”134 
Overall, the importance of these inquiries lies in the ability of the British 
government and its institutions to address the last ten years as a point from which to learn 
from both within their own domestic institutions, as well as their international 
partnerships and alliances, specifically with the United States. Moreover, these inquiries 
indicate the need of the British government to understand the past decisions of its 
leadership and the need to address its relationships with its most important ally, the 
United States, in an effort to continue the indispensible partnership well into the future. 
E. CONCLUSION 
During the Iraq War, the strategic level discussion appeared to have failed in 
certain terms, while the substantive level of the Special Relationship, that of defense and 
intelligence cooperation, among others, continued.135  At the strategic level, Blair 
insisted, “A successful British foreign policy would emerge only out of a strong 
commitment to both the United States and the EU.”136  Unfortunately, Blair was unable 
to bridge the gap between the United States and the EU during his time as Prime 
Minister. In the case of Brown and his government, Brown had failed to learn the lesson 
that President Sarkozy did, which simply stated, was “you cannot hope to build a united 
Europe that is divided towards the United States.”137 
However, in terms of the Special Relationship, the United States and the United 
Kingdom maintained the strongest bilateral relationship, due to the many facets of the 
relationship that worked together and weathered the storm of the Iraq War and 
international criticism.  
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V. AFGHANISTAN 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Shortly after the assault upon the World Trade Center in New York City in 
September 2001, Prime Minister Blair “pledged his solidarity with the United States” and 
said, “we stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy, 
and we, like them, will not rest until this evil is driven from our world.”138  Relations 
between the United Kingdom and the United States were instantly revived due to the 
terrorist actions of the September 11 attacks.  
On 7 October 2001, the campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan began and in 
2003, the operation in Iraq signified a new stage amid peril of strategy and alliance 
cohesion of the Special Relationship. The operation in Afghanistan revealed how the 
Special Relationship aspired to fight on two fronts simultaneously as well as how the 
“good war” in Afghanistan was preferred by Gordon Brown and other members of the 
British government in 2006 to that of the war in Iraq.139  The Iraq mission was 
questioned by both British officials and the public—a circumstance that recalled diverge 
of alliance cohesion in the Second World War and the Korean conflict. For the British, 
the primary mission arising from bin Laden terror was in Afghanistan. The bottom line 
was that British elites and the public alike preferred fighting the war in Afghanistan more 
so than fighting the war in Iraq. 
Over and over again, the UK has been referred to by scholars of international 
affairs as America’s closest ally.140  Throughout the last ten years, “Officials, diplomats, 
and indeed political leaders have continued to share an internationalist worldview and 
work diplomatically to advance a common view of the global order.”141  This being said, 
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“The collaboration on defense policy within NATO and bilaterally is more integrated 
[with the USA] than with any other state, and the integration of their intelligence 
operations is unprecedented in its scale and its trust.”142  Given these two statements, the 
war in Afghanistan is an example of how officials, diplomats, and political leaders have 
worked together, and moreover, how collaboration within NATO, has brought about a 
deeper and more profound dialogue about the war and the Special Relationship.  
This chapter explores the character of the Special Relationship in the past decade 
shaped by the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan, beginning with the relationship 
between Bush and Blair in the context of the war in Afghanistan, the Brown Premiership, 
addressing Bush and Obama’s presidencies, and the Cameron—Obama relationship. The 
chapter will conclude by examining the role of the House of Commons’ UK-U.S. 
Relations Inquiry of 2009–2010 and the role of the United Nations in the war in 
Afghanistan with respect to the Special Relationship in the UN Security Council.  
B. THE BLAIR-BUSH RELATIONSHIP  
The Blair–Bush Relationship during the war in Afghanistan was another example 
of the UK’s close relationship with the United States. As was the case in the war in Iraq, 
Blair offered close support to the United States in Afghanistan.143  Dunn refers to the 
most immediate legacy of the New Labour period as “the lasting impact of Blair’s 
support in Iraq and Afghanistan.”144 
Interestingly, regarding Blair’s role in the War on Terror was Blair’s ability to 
communicate, more clearly than Washington, the intent of the war as not being “a 
crusade against Islam.”145  Although some scholars and politicians argue that Blair’s 
abilities to assist the U.S. held an important role in defining Britain’s influence on U.S. 
foreign policy, Dumbrell suggests that by “seeking to broaden and soften the American 
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agenda, Blair opened himself to the charge of being taken for granted by Washington.”146 
However, “after September 11, he gained increasing popularity and prestige within the 
United States as a leader who stood four-square with the Americans, and indeed one who 
could articulate the case for standing up to terrorists more fluently than their 
president.”147  One could say that such a phenomenon reached back to the experience of 
Churchill in the years 1941–1946 whereby Europeans better articulated an Atlantic 
interest than did the U.S. policy makers themselves, and also had lately been manifest in 
the roles of Walesa and Havel in the early 1990s in the articulation of the need for a 
renewed commitment by the U.S. to Atlantic security in the midst of the end of the Cold 
War.  
In the post–September 11 environment, there was a renewed sense of the Special 
Relationship that had been burdened in the experience of ex-Yugoslavia in the middle to 
late 1990s elations between the United States and the United Kingdom evolved and 
transitioned during this period. In the aftermath of the attacks on the United States, the 
Blair government supported its principle ally and immediately mobilized its forces to 
include the British Special Forces, the British Royal Navy, and over 1800 UK troops that 
“led and coordinated the initial deployment of the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) in Afghanistan.”148  The support by the Blair government in defense matters was 
not the only example of support to the Bush government.  
Throughout the Blair-Bush relationship, this renewed sense of the Special 
Relationship was also made evident by the policy statements of officials within each of 
the governments. Rhetoric by the United States and the UK, namely the ability to convey 
messages of cooperation and understanding, are at the very core of the Special 
Relationship. One key example of is that of Nicholas Burns, at the time, the 
undersecretary at the U.S. State Department for Europe, who regarded the “renewed 
sense of purpose, compromise and unity in transatlantic relations” in a key speech at 
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Chatham House in London on 6 April 2005.149  This example especially from the U.S. 
State Department within the cosmos of agencies of the U.S. government as a whole 
illustrates how positive transatlantic relations were present in the rhetoric and dialogue 
between the two nations even in the midst of war and the chorus of international criticism 
that grew in the face of the especially the Iraqi campaign and its setbacks.  
C. THE BROWN PREMIERSHIP: THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH 
BUSH AND OBAMA 
Upon becoming Prime Minister in July 2007, the unlucky and less statesman like 
Gordon Brown began distancing himself from the unpopular war in Iraq in the face of 
domestic politics, but continued to support the war in Afghanistan. Brown’s approach 
was regarded “both anti-Bush and pro-American,” but achieved neither one.150  Dunn 
suggests this view of Brown in light of the “broader policy towards the United States” in 
which the British government “found itself isolated between two poles.”151  That being 
said, Brown’s support to the war effort in Afghanistan suffered no lapses. In fact, Brown 
increased the number of troops in Afghanistan in support of the “‘good war.”152 
In March 2009, Brown became the first European leader to meet with newly 
elected President Barack Obama. During the visit, both Brown and Obama spoke of the 
importance of the Special Relationship. Brown said he had come to “to renew our Special 
Relationship for new times.”153  He continued by saying, “It is a partnership of purpose 
born out of shared values. It is a partnership of purpose founded on determination to rise 
to every challenge.”154  Obama agreed with Brown and said, “Great Britain is one of our 
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closest and strongest allies and there is a link and bond that will not break.”155  He 
followed by saying, “This notion that somehow there is any lessening of that Special 
Relationship is misguided… The relationship is not only special and strong but will only 
get stronger as time goes on.”156  Although the central topic of the meeting was the 
economy, these statements by each of the leaders revealed the nature of the Special 
Relationship regarding all aspects of the course of Brown and Obama’s terms as leaders 
of the two countries. 
D. THE CAMERON-OBAMA RELATIONSHIP 
On 11 May 2010, President Obama telephoned newly elected Prime Minister 
David Cameron, wherein the “two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the UK-U.S. 
Special Relationship.”157  In an official statement released after the phone call, Obama 
said, “the United States has no closer friend and ally than the United Kingdom, and I 
reiterated my deep and personal commitment to the Special Relationship between our two 
countries–a bond that has endured for generations and across party lines, and that is 
essential to the security and prosperity of our two countries, and the world.”158  He 
concluded with, “I have no doubt that the ties between our two countries will continue to 
thrive in the years to come.”159   
On Cameron’s behalf, a Downing Street spokesman said that Cameron and 
Obama discussed Afghanistan, among other things.160  This phone call set the stage for 
the following year and a half at the leadership levels of Prime Minister/President for the 
Special Relationship in which Afghanistan would be a priority for both leaders to address 
at domestic and international levels.   
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In June 2010, during Cameron and Obama’s first meeting at the G8 and G20 
meetings in Canada, the two leaders agreed “the Afghanistan war must show progress in 
a ‘critical stage’ this year.”161  Furthermore, the BBC reports stated that Obama 
articulated “operations were entering a ‘critical’ period” while Cameron said, “Making 
progress this year, putting everything we have into getting it right this year is vitally 
important.”162 The continued commitment to the war in Afghanistan was evident during 
this meeting as was the countries’ commitment to the Special Relationship. Obama went 
on to add that the Special Relationship was “built on a rock solid foundation and would 
only get stronger.”163   
The relationship between Obama and Cameron is one highlighted by the 
surge/withdrawal approach to the war in Afghanistan. The new approach as identified in 
March 2009, was unveiled by Obama as a “new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan to 
combat an increasingly ‘perilous situation,’” wherein 4,000 U.S. personnel were sent in 
to “train and bolster the Afghan army and police.”164  Additionally, “support for civilian 
development” was also included in the new strategy.165  This new strategy was echoed by 
the Cameron administration as well.  
With the death of the chief enemy, Osama bin Laden, in May 2011 in Pakistan, a 
certain feeling of accomplishment manifested within the Obama administration, and 
furthermore, within the Special Relationship. Cameron’s speech on 5 May 2011 
highlighted the close relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom 
regarding the War on Terror and the war in Afghanistan.  
The losses from both sides of the Atlantic in the September 11 attacks reveals yet 
another example of all that is shared between the United States and the United Kingdom. 
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Cameron’s speech makes it clear that the British have been standing side by side the 
Americans in the fight and should be remembered thusly.166  
We should remember today in particular the brave British servicemen and 
women who have given their lives in the fight against terrorism across the 
world. And we should pay tribute especially to those British forces who 
have played their part over the last decade in the hunt for bin Laden. He 
was the man who was responsible for 9/11–which was not only an horrific 
killing of Americans, but remains to this day, the largest loss of British life 
in any terrorist attack.167 
In June 2011, The Telegraph reported Cameron’s intent to order more British 
troops out of Afghanistan.168  The announcement followed Obama’s announcement for a 
withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. The significant issue within this statement, 
expressed in the first line of the article, was that Obama and Cameron were on the phone 
coordinating the troop withdrawal prior to Obama’s announcement to the United 
States.169  The coordination between the United States and the United Kingdom at its 
highest levels is key and illustrates the closeness between the two countries and their 
leaders in the war in Afghanistan. 
E. THE ROLE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY: THE HOUSE OF 
COMMONS UK-U.S. RELATIONS INQUIRY 
The UK-U.S. Inquiry conducted by Parliament, which officially began on 30 July 
2009 revealed some of the major issues, from the British perspective, regarding U.S.-UK 
involvement in Afghanistan. Overall, the inquiry spoke to military and defense 
cooperation, a central tenet of the Special Relationship, and also took into account the 
future of the UK’s involvement in U.S. led initiatives, specifically that of Afghanistan. 
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In 2010, the UK’s inquiry revealed various key points regarding the nature and 
character of the war in Afghanistan from the British viewpoint. Despite criticism of how 
intelligence was handled in the prelude to the Iraq campaign, as well as other issues of 
alliance cohesion (i.e. Blair the poodle), the UK government inquiry placed a high value 
on the role of UK-U.S. military and defense cooperation.170  Moreover, the manner in 
which military and defense cooperation manifested itself in the conflict of Afghanistan is 
of particular interest and reveals how the government of the United Kingdom envisions 
the role of the UK-U.S. in the conflict.  
With regard to UK-U.S. military and defense cooperation, the inquiry “Concluded 
that stabilization in Afghanistan does require provision of security, good governance, and 
a belief within the local population that international forces will outlast the 
insurgents.”171  That being said,  
There can be no question of the international community abandoning 
Afghanistan, and that the need for the international community to convey 
publicly that it intends to outlast the insurgency and remain in Afghanistan 
until the Afghan authorities are able to take control of their own security, 
must be a primary objective.172 
The inquiry “concluded that in the short term, the United Kingdom should 
continue to do all it can to assist the United States in the areas where it is also in the UK’s 
security interests to do so, most notably in Afghanistan….”173 Furthermore, “In the 
longer term, the Government’s foreign and security policy needs to be driven by the 
UK’s national security obligations including those towards Britain’s Overseas Territories, 
its NATO commitments and its security partnership with the United States”174    
The inquiry addresses the importance of stability, security, and good governance, 
which are all central to the ideals of the United States and the United Kingdom. The 
inquiry’s assessment of the long-term goals of the UK’s foreign and security policy is of 
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particular importance given its acknowledgment of the UK’s national security obligations 
which include its security partnership with the United States  Thus, the continued 
coordination and cooperation of the United Kingdom and the United States will continue 
well into the future, attesting to the centrality of the Special Relationship in the foreign 
and security policies of the United Kingdom. 
F. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
The integration of United Nations (UN) authority and decision making into the 
war in Afghanistan was unlike the case of Iraq in 2002–2003 with the motto of the 
“mission defines the coalition.”  Different from the war in Iraq in its opening phases, the 
role of the United Nations has loomed large in the war in Afghanistan, given the U.S. and 
UK’s initiatives to involve the organization, which is the bedrock of international 
organizations and collective security as well as collective defense. With the release of UN 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 on 20 December 2001, the establishment of 
an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was an immediate action that has 
resulted in a multilateral effort, authorizing the deployment for six months of an ISAF 
which in its first phase was limited to the security of Kabul and then took on additional 
roles and missions.175  Follow-on resolutions have continued to provide guidance and 
authorization to the western and allied campaign in Afghanistan.  
Even with the multilateral effort that as of 2006 assumed a more pronounced 
NATO character and operational dimension, the United States and the United Kingdom 
remain the largest contributors of troops to Afghanistan.176  The multilateral context of 
the war in Afghanistan, compounded by the cause of the war, has created a perception 
different from that of the Iraq war in the minds of British and American citizens alike. 
While the unpopular war in Iraq comes to a close, the war in Afghanistan continues and  
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is becoming increasingly unpopular, however for different reasons in the United 
Kingdom, there mostly related to defense budget cuts, the economy, and the status of the 
forces.  
Overall, the Special Relationship continues to be a powerful force within the 
United Nations and by extension, NATO. Conversely, the United Nations and NATO 
have played an important role in the Special Relationship by assisting in the 
legitimization of the war in Afghanistan and by bringing a multilateral approach to the 
role of intervention in Afghanistan. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The war in Afghanistan has proved to be an example of the Special Relationship 
leading the world towards greater democracy, rule of law, human rights, and fighting in a 
multilateral context. Perceptions of the United Kingdom and the United States have 
shifted from perceptions of unilateralism and “going at it alone” to a new approach 
embracing multilateral policies in the fight against terror. In the war in Afghanistan, 
especially, a sense of cooperation and coordination between the two partners has 
characterized the Special Relationship.  
In the war in Afghanistan, the Special Relationship has gone through changes that 
are important to the role of the Special Relationship in the twenty-first century. Although 
the Special Relationship has been close at the personal level since the Bush–Blair 
administration, and has remained close at some points albeit to a perceived lesser degree, 
the role of military action by coalitions at the international level and within the construct 
of the United Nations has made the Special Relationship a popular institution and force 
within the international system of states.  
The United Nations has played a role in Afghanistan that is poignantly different 
from the role the United Nations played in the war Iraq. It is clear the UN resolutions and 
the creation of the ISAF in Afghanistan have proven to be the vehicle through which the 
war has been fought and continues to be fought in late 2011. However, with the 
impending withdrawal of U.S. and UK forces as portrayed by Prime Minister Cameron 
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and President Obama in 2011, only time will tell the true benefit provided by the military, 
diplomatic, and political dimensions of the Special Relationship in the future of the 
country of Afghanistan. 
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In February 2011, the Special Relationship again confronted conflict of an 
unexpected kind in a new phase of a new century that had seen a major political upheaval 
in the Arab world that overturned the ruling order of more than half a century. In the 
North African country of Libya, an uprising against Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, a 
figure who had been a thorn in the side of the United States and United Kingdom for 
decades, beginning in the city of Benghazi led to an attack against protesters by Libyan 
forces. While numerous Libyan diplomats resigned from their positions in protest to the 
attack, Qaddafi insisted, “that he would not quit.”177  In March 2011, the UN Security 
Council released United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973, which 
authorized a no-fly zone over Libya, as well as air strikes, to be conducted by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in order to protect civilians.178,179  On 20 October 
2011, Qaddafi was killed and the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) officially 
declared Libya as liberated on 23 October 2011.180  
Under NATO, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and other allies 
and partners conducted military operations in Libya in support of UNSCR 1973. While 
the United States and the United Kingdom were involved in the entire process, President 
Obama’s approach to supporting the war in Libya was constructed in a multilateral 
context from the very beginning and conceived in plain contrast to the mission defines 
the coalition approach of the era 2001 and 2002 in preparation for the Iraqi campaign of 
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the following year. Obama’s expression of a need for a multilateral approach to the action 
in Libya was undertaken and NATO acted as a kind of alibi of a nation for the U.S. desire 
to avoid what seemed to many makers of policy as the errors of alliance cohesion in the 
years 2003 and following. Unlike the case of Iraq, the Libyan case demonstrated the 
United States and the United Kingdom’s willingness and belief in the necessity to act in a 
multilateral manner under the United Nations and within the construct of NATO. This 
policy also included a major role for the French, whose reintegration into the NATO 
military command organization had unfolded months before.  
In this chapter, the Special Relationship will be revealed from the viewpoint of 
the Cameron-Obama bilateral relationship. Obama’s approach in dealing with Libya is of 
particular interest to identifying the nature and character of the Special Relationship 
during 2011, that is, as war in Iraq has been more or less ending and the winding down 
phase of operations in Afghanistan. Also addressed in this chapter is the role of NATO as 
the organization leading the military effort in Libya. 
B. THE CAMERON-OBAMA RELATIONSHIP 
The multilateral approach by President Barack Obama, as opposed to the 
unilateral policies of the Bush administration, has been important to the strategic debate 
of the Libyan conflict and the role for intervention in North Africa. From the very 
beginning, it seemed as if the Obama administration was not willing to proceed in Libya 
only with a U.S. coalition of the willing, per se, but instead within the auspices of a UN-
NATO multilateral operation as has been more or less the custom of U.S. statecraft for 
more than a century and was dumped with great sound by the Bush administration after 
September 2001.  
The role of international institutions in the conflict in Libya, a vital element 
within the Special Relationship, was as important in Libya as it was throughout the Iraq 
and Afghanistan wars. Most notably, that of the United Nations and NATO—working 
through institutions that were originally founded by the partners of the Special 
Relationship—to deal with the issues of the world in a multilateral fashion is well worth 
analysis as concerns the values that are at the core of the Special Relationship, as well as 
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the shared interests. The ability of the Special Relationship to employ these international 
institutions in the case of Libya, was first demonstrated by the administrations of 
Cameron and then Obama working through the UN to seek a Resolution for the conflict 
in Libya. Also, the ability of the United Stattes and the United Kingdom to seek out 
diplomatic, economic, and political options, versus solely the use of combat as a 
substitute for policy, was highlighted throughout the discussions between Obama and 
Cameron prior to the approval of UNSCR 1973.  
On 8 March 2011, The Telegraph reported Obama and Cameron’s “full spectrum 
plan of action on Libya.”181  Within the ideas being discussed for a plan, there was a 
request by the Libyan rebels for a no-fly zone.182  Surveillance and enforcement of the 
arms embargo against Libya were also considerations within the plan.183  These features 
of policy recalled the Balkans in the 1990s, whose errors of policy loomed large in the 
need to act at the moment in 2011.  An important aspect of the plan in relation to the no-
fly zone was Obama’s reluctance, more so than that of Cameron and President Nicolas 
Sarkozy of France, in supporting the no-fly zone.184  Obama’s reluctance would also be 
visible in later negotiations of the path to take in actions in Libya.  
On 21 April 2011, The Telegraph reported Cameron and Obama “agreed that UN 
Security Council resolutions demanding that the Libyan government cease violence 
against civilians must be fully implemented.”185  Furthermore, according to a White 
House statement, “In addition to increasing military pressure and protecting civilians 
through the coalition operation that NATO is leading, the leaders discussed the 
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importance of increasing diplomatic and economic pressure on the Gaddafi regime to 
cease attacks on civilians and comply with UN Security Council resolutions.”186  
Obama was reported by The Telegraph as supporting “A French and British move 
to dispatch military advisers to help rebels fighting Gaddafi,” although he “still opposes 
sending U.S. ground troops to Libya.”187  Although Cameron and Obama agreed on the 
use of military pressure in Libya, the way in which each President chose to deal with the 
issue militarily was slightly different. In the same White House comments given by 
White House Spokesman, Jay Carney, and reported in The Telegraph, “The president 
obviously is aware of this decision and supports it, and hopes and believes it will help the 
opposition,” “But it does not at all change the president’s policy on no ‘boots on the 
ground’ for American troops.”188 
In May 2011, just before Obama’s state visit to the UK, tensions were reportedly 
rising between the U.S. and UK regarding each other’s involvement in Libya.189  On the 
one hand, “Britain wants the U.S. to take more of a defined role in the campaign, with 
UK military chiefs protesting that the effectiveness of bombing raids is being lessened by 
the absence of American leadership.”190  While on the other hand, “U.S. diplomatic 
sources, meanwhile, have criticized Britain as a ‘skittish’ and unpredictable ally which 
frequently issues a ‘red card’ -- effectively vetoing a target, causing confusion and greatly 
hampering proper planning.”191   This kind of exchange also recalled the burden sharing 
back-biting of the Cold War and particularly the issue of policy and strategy in south 
eastern Europe in the middle and late 1990s. Sensing the differences between the two 
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allies, Obama issued a letter to Congress in which he addressed the lack of leadership and 
pointed to the limited nature of the campaign in Libya.192  Furthermore, in addressing 
Congress with the letter, Obama who is “facing rising political clamor in the U.S. against 
the Libyan campaign,” stated “It has always been my view that it is better to take military 
action, even in limited actions such as this, with Congressional engagement, consultation, 
and support.”193  This statement, of course, signaled the importance of Congressional 
support, which similar to the role of Parliament to the Prime Minister, is necessary to the 
U.S. Presidency. However, in the case of the U.S. president, the anti-European and anti-
NATO rhetoric of a particular party operated in this case, as well as the heirs of Robert 
Taft in the great debate to limit presidential power in national security affairs.  
In light of these differences, Obama and Cameron were going to address the issue 
during the state visit, among a host of other issues at hand. During the visit, both leaders 
came together on the subject of Libya on a number of points. Cameron started the 
dialogue by stating, that “in their (Cameron and Obama’s) approach to North Africa they 
had ‘ruled out occupying forces and invading armies,’” thus differentiating the Obama–
Cameron approach in Libya to that of the Bush–Blair approach to Iraq.194  Obama 
followed by stating, “they were using military power ‘in a strategically careful way.’”195 
The two leaders continued exhibiting this sense of cooperation, coordination, and 
commitment to the Special Relationship and to the charge at hand, the events in Libya, 
throughout Obama’s state visit. The Special Relationship “was not just ‘special,’ but 
‘essential’ too” and it was not only between these two particular leaders, but with every 
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leader of the UK and U.S.196  In his own words, Obama “insisted that the relationship 
between the two countries didn’t just depend on the relationship between the two leaders. 
The alliance would be consistent ‘regardless of who the president or the prime minister is 
and it’s going to be consistent regardless of what parties we come from.”197  Obama 
continued by saying, “I believe it (the Special Relationship) is stronger than it’s ever 
been…and I’m committed to making sure it stays that way.”198   
Turning back to the issue of Libya, Obama stated that both he and Cameron 
agreed that they could not deploy ground troops to Libya and the “Libyan opposition 
needed to play the role on the ground.”199  Instead, as Cameron said, “patience and 
persistence was needed from the alliance” as the “Libyan opposition was being built 
up.”200  Both leaders agreed that there would be “no let up” and Qaddafi needed to go.201 
The National Transitional Council (NTC) officially declared Libya to have been 
liberated on 23 October 2011, just three days after the death of Qaddafi on 20 October 
2011.202  On 31 October 2011, NATO forces concluded the last mission of Operation 
Unified Protector in Libya.203  
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C. THE ROLE OF NATO 
While the war in Afghanistan became the most difficult out-of-area deployment 
for NATO forces, the campaign in Libya would prove to be a new chapter of a different 
kind that recalled the early phase of the Afghan campaign, as well as other episodes in 
the history of the alliance. The NATO role in taking over control for military operations 
under UNSCR 1973, marked the second time NATO forces have agreed to fight an out-
of-area conflict. Yugoslavia was the first real out of area conflict, even if it was in 
Europe, it was not technically in the NATO area. Under the name, Operation Unified 
Protector (OUP), NATO’s mission is “to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas 
under threat of attack.”204  Also, NATO forces would be involved in “enforcing an arms 
embargo and maintaining a no-fly zone.”205  
During the operation, no NATO ground troops were involved.206 According to 
NATO, “NATO’s success to date has been achieved solely with air and sea forces.”207  
In April 2011, NATO allies and non-NATO allies agreed to be  
Committed to using all necessary resources and maximum operational 
flexibility to meet the UN mandate until such time that: all attacks on 
civilians and civilian-populated areas have ended, the Qaddafi regime 
withdraws all military and paramilitary forces to bases, and the Qaddafi 
regime permits immediate, full, safe and unhindered access to 
humanitarian aid for the Libyan people.208 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the NATO Secretary General, during a visit to the 
United States on 10 May 2011, attested to NATO’s “acting under the authority of an 
historic UN Security Council Resolution.”209  He stated, “Just like Afghanistan, Libya is 
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a strong demonstration of NATO’s resolve.”210  Through shared values and freedoms, the 
NATO allies together can counter those who threaten the alliance.  
Interestingly enough, Rasmussen’s comments contain the tenets of the Special 
Relationship as same are evident in the institution of NATO. The organization, founded 
over sixty years ago, still shares the same “values of freedom, democracy, and 
humanity,” remains true to the founders’ intent and vision for a safer Euro-Atlantic 
region as enshrined in the articles of the Washington Treaty and as these have evolved 
since 1949 in a series of crises. Even though the campaign in Libya was fought in a 
multilateral fashion through the institution of NATO, the United States and the United 
Kingdom remained central to the formation of policy and its realization in combat. The 
forces of the Special Relationship were not only evident in NATO at its beginning after 
the Second World War, but still continue as a formidable power in the twenty-first 
century. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The conflict in Libya demonstrated the continued cooperation and coordination 
between the United States and the United Kingdom at various levels within the Special 
Relationship. The search for diplomatic, economic, and political options, as well as 
military ones, tor solve the conflict in Libya highlights the role of the leadership within 
the Special Relationship, and its continued focus on dealing with challenges in an ever-
changing world.  
The ability of the United States and the United Kingdom to seek a multilateral 
approach from the inception of the Libyan crisis is completely different from that of Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Obama’s unwillingness to go it alone versus that of Bush’s unilateralist 
push into war in Iraq was a change in U.S. statecraft that resonated within the Cameron 
government. Involvement by the United Nations and furthermore by NATO as the  
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organization leading the military effort was not only key in the Libyan crisis, but 
indicative of a changing pattern in how the leaders of the Special Relationship were going 
to conduct military operations in the new decade.  
The campaign in Libya reflects how the policy and strategy of the United States 
and the United Kingdom has changed under the administrations of Obama and Cameron 
in coordinating and cooperating to achieve a multilateral approach, but the campaign also 
demonstrates the staying power of institutions within democracies such as evidenced by 
the U.S. Congress and the UK military, who remain focused on their priorities to achieve 
the mission.  
In conclusion, the campaign in Libya serves as a springboard for new multilateral 
operations based on the institutions, values, and precepts of the Special Relationship, 
where the issue of burden-sharing and alliance cohesion may be less of an issue than in 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
A. HISTORY OF SHARED INTERESTS, COOPERATION, AND 
UNDERSTANDING 
Critics on both sides of the Atlantic have reflected upon and criticized the policy 
and strategy of the United States and the United Kingdom in the campaigns in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Libya. The question that requires attention, however, is the Special 
Relationship and its durability, purpose, relevance and significance in the twenty-first 
century. With this question in mind, the Special Relationship continues to be a force 
within the European system of states and the international system of states as a whole.  
The Special Relationship is a distinctive partnership built upon a history of shared 
values, interests, culture, and cooperation in peace and war. From the diplomatic, 
political, and economic ties to its connections in the realm of military, security, nuclear, 
and defense affairs, the Special Relationship’s uniqueness and deep ties prove its 
durability and its ability to change and continue as a force for democratic values, human 
rights, and rule of law in the world.  This pact has been especially subject to stress in the 
last ten years since 11 September, but shows more durability than say, the United States 
and German relationship, which had been formerly a close one and has become 
problematic since the Schroeder chancellorship and the advent of a German policy of 
equidistance with its allies and others.  
The three case studies demonstrate the evolution of the Special Relationship, 
beginning with the Bush-Blair connection to the Brown premiership during the Bush and 
Obama presidencies to the Cameron-Obama relationship. From a policy point of mission 
defines the coalition to fighting in a multilateral context within the institutions of NATO 
and the UN, the Special Relationship has endured not only policy changes and strategic 
reassessments, but has faced these crisis together.  
The case studies further reveal the strength and enduring qualities of the Special 
Relationship in values, interests, as well as personalities and the institutions within the 
bilateral relationship. While the personalities at the highest levels of the U.S. and UK 
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governments provide the strategy and policy context of this relationship, the other aspects 
of the relationship, for example, the military, defense, and security cooperation and 
coordination that exists within the Special Relationship continues to thrive at the 
operational and tactical levels ultimately providing the momentum and drive to move 
together into the next decade.  The closeness of military affairs in the wake of the last 
decade is noteworthy and reflects a degree of integration and cooperation on an 
unprecedented scale.  
B. THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP IN 2011: THE WAY AHEAD?  
The Special Relationship continues with a renewed focus based on the shared 
values, traditions, and institutions that have sustained this bilateral feature of the 
international system through crisis and calm. The most recent example of U.S.-UK 
cooperation has been President Obama’s visit to the United Kingdom in May 2011. The 
three-day state visit to the United Kingdom marked the first visit by a U.S. President 
since the year 2003 and the first time a U.S. President has addressed members of the 
House of Commons and peers in Westminster Hall.  
The speeches and statements made by President Obama and Prime Minister 
Cameron are indicative of the direction in which the Special Relationship appears to be 
headed in the remaining years of the decade. Obama and Cameron began the state visit by 
agreeing that the bilateral relationship between the two countries “is an essential one.”211  
This particular point was highlighted by other media outlets such as the BBC with its 
joint article in the Times reporting, 
Mr. Obama and Mr. Cameron have described the relationship between the 
United Kingdom and the United States as essential. Ours is not just a 
special relationship, it is an essential relationship - for us and for the 
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world. When the United States and Britain stand together, our people and 
people around the world can become more secure and more prosperous.212  
During the visit, President Obama remarked that the Special Relationship would 
continue “regardless of who the president or the prime minister is and it’s going to be 
consistent regardless of what parties we come from.”213  This statement is an ambitious 
one that makes a process seem to be easy that actually has been far from it especially in 
the legacy of a decade of conflict as well as the world financial crisis which has 
particularly harmed London and Washington. Obama continued by stating, “there are few 
nations that stand firmer, speak louder and fight harder to defend democratic values 
around the world than the United States and the United Kingdom.”214  The United States 
and the United Kingdom would be entering a “new chapter in our shared history with 
new challenges” and the time had come for the United States and its European allies, the 
West, to lead.215 
The state visit was one filled with purpose and vision for the future collaboration 
between the two countries. This hope was demonstrated by Obama and Cameron’s press 
conference whereby they defined “six specific areas where the United Kingdom and the 
United States will strengthen their co-operation in the coming months.”216  These six 
areas are primarily focused on the following areas, as detailed by the UK’s Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office: security and support to Armed Forces personnel; commitments to 
collaboration in science, higher education, volunteerism, and international development; 
and the development of cyberspace.217  Within the area of security, a U.S.-UK Joint 
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Strategy Board will be formed to “develop a coordinated approach to long term 
challenges in the global economic and security environment.”218  This serves as yet 
another example of the Special Relationship’s shared tradition of institution building 
which forms an especially vital aspect of this force in the international system. Overall, 
these six areas signify the diversity of the special relationship in its ability to address 
challenges and collaborate within a number of areas within society. 
In 2008, Dunn articulated the following,  
For the UK to maintain good relations with Washington requires more 
than the continuation of its long-established military, economic, financial 
and intelligence links. It also demands that its leaders maintain good 
personal relations with the incumbent of the White House as a matter of 
necessity, whoever that incumbent might be. The atmospherics of 
diplomacy, style, good presentation, supportive rhetoric and the avoidance 
of public criticism are all necessary for continued harmony in relations on 
the more fundamental issues.219  
In 2011, the meetings between Obama and Cameron exemplify this very suggestion for 
the affairs of the Special Relationship.  
Given the context of the last ten years throughout the episodes of Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Libya, the Special Relationship has remained a powerful force-player in 
the international system of states. With its renewed focus and commitment, as exhibited 
by President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron in 2011, there is no doubt that the 
Special Relationship will continue well onto the future.  
C. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Special Relationship has persevered and survived through some 
of the most difficult crises of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Born in crisis at the 
darkest moments of the Second World War, the special relationship endured in the crises 
of the cold war and has further evolved in the challenges of the present. These include the  
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya campaigns to the issues of the International economic crisis, 
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the British and U.S. National debt and defense budget cut issues, the Special Relationship 
continues. This complicated relationship between the two English-speaking countries 
endures in spite of the negative attitudes of Anti-Americanism. Built upon the values and 
traditions of the United States and United Kingdom and supported by the commitment of 
its leadership and institutions, the Special Relationship will continue as the principal 
bilateral relationship in the world for the next one hundred years.  
Furthermore, the significance of the Special Relationship lies in the shared values, 
traditions, and institutions of the United States and the United Kingdom. As evidenced 
throughout the thesis, the personalities, institutions, strategies, and policies shared 
between the two countries garner a sense of cooperation and understanding unlike any 
other bilateral relationship in the world. Ultimately, the importance of the Special 
Relationship lies in the fact that the Special Relationship is neither fiction nor myth. The 
Special Relationship is a real partnership that has endured crises of all sorts and continues 
to flourish and prosper even after ten years of hardship and war. The Special Relationship 
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